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Aristotle and Real Possibility
Peter Quigley
Ross, Hintikka, Waterlow and Makin have all suggested that there is something prob-
lematic about Aristotle’s treatment of possibility. I will canvas their concerns and pro-
pose that the problem is not so much with Aristotle as the fact that the notion of 
possibility is not a single simple concept. I will present eight different components of 
the notion of possibility and suggest that Aristotle may have been aware of all of them. 
I will conclude whilst his treatment can appear inconsistent, it is instead, an attempt 
to give a complete description of a complex notion.
Introduction
A number of scholars have suggested that there is something wrong with Aristotle’s 
discussion of possibility. In section 1, I will canvas their concerns and will agree that 
they are justified.
I will argue that the problem arises because the word possible is ambiguous and 
has many different meanings, depending on context, even in English. In section 2, I 
will consider possibility as capacity, possibility as chance, possibility as a conjecture 
in an argument, possibility as fiction, and possibility as arising from human agency 
and creativity. I will show that all of these different readings occur in Aristotle and 
argue that these differences might contribute to reading Aristotle’s discussions in a 
consistent manner. I will conclude that Aristotle is being complete in his treatment 
of possibility rather than inconsistent.
1. Some Problems
In moral philosophy and metaphysics we are confronted by the problem of free will 
and determinism. Science tells us the world is deterministic. This means that my 
actions are determined and not voluntary. Hence, how can I be morally responsible? 
How can I be blamed or praised? In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle raises this ques-
tion in regard to involuntary acts. Ross (1923:201) suggests that Aristotle may have 
also confronted the bigger problem of determinism. Human beings love the idea of 
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causation. Prior to natural science the cause of things was attributed to the Gods or 
maybe things just happened — everything was possible. Aristotle may have been the 
first to realise that strict causation of things leads to determinism, makes everything 
necessary and eliminates all possibility.
In his book Aristotle, Ross (1923:31) says “It is excessively hard to be sure whether 
Aristotle thinks in the long run that there is a sphere of real contingency in the world”. 
In other words, is Aristotle a realist about possibilities? Why should Ross voice this 
worry?
Throughout his works Aristotle is engaged in two important tasks. There is an 
ontological task of telling us what really exists in the world and what reality is like. 
Also there is an epistemic task of developing a style of reasoning, or argumentation, 
for discovering the truth. Hintikka (2004) presents us with an analysis of Aristotle’s 
method, which seems to be based around the use of syllogisms. We will see in section 
2.5 that some premises of an argument are identified as mere possibilities.
Aristotle does not always clearly distinguish between these two tasks. Whilst 
some of his books are clearly about methods of reasoning to obtain the truth (i.e. 
the Analytics and Sophistical Refutations), the Metaphysics and On Interpretation 
seem to be a combination of both ontology and epistemology. One might wonder 
whether Aristotle believes the context clarifies what he is doing. Aristotle’s epis-
temic method starts by considering the possible alternative answers to a particular 
question. Thus, possibility has a role to play in his epistemic task. He reasons about 
possibilia in the same way a modern scientist might compare alternative theories. 
If we read Aristotle as just identifying possibilities with fictional elements used in 
an argument, then this might justify Ross’s worry about whether Aristotle believes 
in real world possibilities.
Later, Ross voices a slightly different worry about Aristotle’s notion of contin-
gency. Since contingent (P) can be defined as “possibly (P) and possibly (not-P)” 
this concern will also apply to Aristotle’s notion of possibility. “Aristotle frequently 
distinguishes between the necessary and the contingent element in the universe. 
It is not always clear whether he means that there are events which are objectively 
underdetermined, or is distinguishing between necessity which we can trace and 
that which eludes us; but apparently he believes that in human action, at all events, 
there is an actual contingency” (1923:188). There are two concerns here. First, there 
is the issue of causation or determination and an identification of possibility with 
being “objectively underdetermined”. Secondly, there is the identification of possibil-
ity with a lack of knowledge. If a necessary chain of causes eludes us, especially in 
the case of future events, then we cannot predict the outcome and tend to say that 
alternative outcomes are both possible. In section two we will see that both readings 
can be found in Aristotle.
Hintikka (1959:136) suggests that Aristotle has a multiplicity of approaches to 
modal logic and “In different parts of his modal syllogistic, he relies on different 
principles, often based on independent insights into the logic of modal notions. There 
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is no reason to believe that these principles are all compatible, even though each of 
them embodies a valid insight or at least an idea that is in itself unobjectionable”. He 
goes on to suggest that the different principles are incompatible and hence attempts 
to derive a single all encompassing modal logic for Aristotle is misguided.
I will endorse Hintikka’s position but extend it. In section two we will see that 
possibility is not a single notion but has multiple elements, and thus we should expect 
to see different principles and even different modal logics depending which type of 
possibility Aristotle is discussing.
Waterlow’s 1982 book Passage and Possibility argues that Aristotle identifies possi-
bility with the extensional notion of occurring-at-some-time and thus we can question 
whether Aristotle’s notion of possibility corresponds to any of our modern notions.
Finally, Stephen Makin (2006:xxiiff) notes that in translating Aristotle, the selec-
tion of the two different words “capacity” and “potentiality” seems to be a choice of 
the translator. Whilst “potentiality” seems synonymous with “possibility”, a capacity 
is much more like a concrete disposition or property that one might possess. In line 
with this distinction, Wikipedia (2013) quotes the Perseus dictionary: “Dunamis is 
an ordinary Greek word for possibility or power. Depending on context, it could be 
translated ‘potency’, ‘potential’, ‘capacity’, ‘ability’, ‘power’, ‘capability’, ‘strength’, ‘pos-
sibility’, ‘force’ and is the root of the modern English words ‘dynamic’, ‘dynamite’, and 
‘dynamo’”. Aristotle himself recognises this ambiguity: in On Interpretation (ch. 13) 
he says: 
For the term ‘possible’ is ambiguous, being used in the one case with reference to facts, 
to that which is actualised, as when a man is said to find walking possible because he 
is actually walking, and generally when a capacity is predicated because it is actually 
realised; in the other case, with reference to a state in which realisation is condition-
ally practicable, as when a man is said to find walking possible because under certain 
conditions he would walk.
Makin seems to be suggesting that Aristotle might be made consistent by judicious 
choice of translations. His translation of Metaphysics Theta focuses on just “capacity” 
and “potentiality”, however, I believe we also need to keep in mind the many other 
meanings captured by the notion of possibility.
To help clarify Aristotle’s views we next need to look at how we might understand 
the idea of possibility. We will discover justifications for Ross and Waterlow’s posi-
tions. I will conclude that if Aristotle was dealing with possibility as an ambiguous 
term, then Makin’s suggestion that any problems we find might be resolved by careful 
translations of the synonyms for possible is the correct view to take.
2. Defining Possibility
We need to consider different senses or meanings for the term “possible”. The first 
examples I will consider are all different types of capacity or power or ability. A 
capacity is something I have but may not be using at any particular time. If I have a 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
PETER QUIGLEY
54
capacity to do X then it is possible for me to do X. An issue for Aristotle will be how 
to tell what capacities I have.
Hintikka (in Time and Necessity, 1973:100, 162, 171, cited by Waterlow, 1982:3) 
proposes that Aristotle’s syllogism provides us with knowledge of someone’s capaci-
ties. For example:
1) All healthy men have the capacity to walk,
2) I am a healthy man;
Hence 3) I have the capacity to walk and it is possible for me to walk.
This syllogistic reasoning allows us to talk about unrealised capacities, however 
it may lead to a problem for Aristotle. Whilst the first (major) premise is an essential 
truth about healthy men, the second (minor) premise about me may be true, but it is 
not a necessary truth. Thus the conclusion may be just a truth. However, it can become 
a necessary truth if we can verify the fact of me walking by observing it occurring at 
some time. For Aristotle the combination of syllogism and perception can provide 
us with necessary truths.
In De Caelo ( 281a 7–27, Waterlow, 1982:57) Aristotle considers the case of walking 
a long distance or lifting a weight. Aristotle claims that when talking of these par-
ticular capacities we always refer to the maximum. Whilst it is true that an Olympic 
weightlifter could lift the same amount as the average man, we identify his capacity 
with the maximum weight he actually lifts.
In both these cases, a capacity, and the possibility of its use requires that it occur-at-
some-time. This is Waterlow’s type of possibility. So, at least in some cases, possibility 
reduces to occurs-at-some-time.
A capacity is something that I really possess, so Ross’s first worry about an arena of 
real possibility is answered: these are real possibilities. However, considering capaci-
ties as a power-to-do-something makes it causal and determined, thus the issue of 
underdetermined possibility remains.
2.1 Capacity simpliciter
Since my legs are fully functioning I have the capacity to be walking or to be sitting. 
This capacity can be used right now. We have both physical capacities and knowledge-
based capacities. Aristotle uses both of these examples. A capacity seems to be an active 
kind of thing, a necessary cause for us to do something. There is a more passive case, 
which we might want to distinguish. A wall can be painted. It is the type of surface 
that can exist as painted or not painted. In this case the change is instigated by an 
external agent and the object is being affected (Makin, 2006:xii).
A physical capacity is the sort of thing that exists at a particular time. Capacities 
vary between individuals and at different times. The adult Hercules can defeat the 
lion of Nemea but as a child he did not have that capacity. Also he had that capacity 
whilst I do not and never will. Thus the notion of capacity, and hence this reading 
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of possibility, is not an absolute notion, or as Aristotle would say it is qualified: it is 
relative to individuals and to a particular time.
2.2 Having knowledge and the possibility of its use
The Megarian position is that capacities only exist when they are being used 
(Metaphysics Theta, 1046b29ff). Aristotle rejects this and says that they are actual 
and exist at other times as well. For Aristotle capacities or the potential-to-do exists. 
Our knowledge of building a house exists in three different ways: firstly when we are 
actually using it to build a house; secondly, when we use it in reasoning about what 
materials might be required to build the house; and thirdly, even when we are not 
aware of the knowledge, (i.e. it is unconscious). Furthermore, Aristotle claims about 
knowledge (Metaphysics, 1049b30ff) that we learn “to play the harp by playing it, and 
all other learners do similarly”. Thus, as with Waterlow, we can identify knowledge 
capacities with occurring-at-some-time.
2.3 Possibility as attainability
At the very end of the Politics Aristotle is considering the case of education, and he 
states that “two principles need to be kept in view, what is possible, what is becoming: 
at these every man ought to aim” (Politics, bk 8, ch. 7). In this situation the possible 
is distant in time. We cannot do it immediately, it is something that through training 
and development we will become capable of doing. In this case we use the term “pos-
sible” to refer to something we can achieve or attain. The long-term goal may be what 
Aristotle identifies as our telos. The achievement is constrained by physical facts and 
will occur at some time if the right intervening actions are taken. This change from 
potential to actual is the fulfilment of our goal, but Aristotle recognises that we may 
be frustrated in that pursuit.
Since the possibility is aimed at occurring at some time, Waterlow’s concern about 
the identification of possibility with temporal notions remains, although the case of 
unfulfilled goals may be a problem for her view, since in this case, failure means that 
the possibility does not occur at any time. As training to attain some possible goal is 
a completely deterministic process, Ross’s worry about determinism also remains.
These three concepts of possibility as a type of capacity support Waterlow’s view 
that possibility can be reduced to the temporal notion of occurring–at-some-time. 
They also support Ross’s two worries that the term “possible” may just stand in 
for a lack of knowledge about someone’s abilities, and that the capacity is causally 
determined.
I next move on to consider possibility as a chance event. We tend to think of 
chance as a possibility that is uncaused but Aristotle rejects this, thus supporting 
Ross’s case. Chance events are things that occur at some time so Waterlow’s iden-
tification of possibility with occurring-at-some-time is also seen to be justified by 
this example.
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2.4 Possibility as chance
Ross’s requirement that a possibility is underdetermined corresponds to our modern 
notion of chance. Chance events can occur in the past or be future possibilities. Chance 
events are uncaused. Unfortunately Aristotle’s notion of causation does not correspond 
to our modern ideas. Thus, Ross and Aristotle disagree about what constitutes a cause 
and underdetermination.
In Physics II Aristotle considers the case of two people going to the market to 
shop and meeting each other by chance. Their purpose in going to the market was 
not to meet but they had a prior necessary and sufficient cause to go to the market. 
Their goal was to shop. For Aristotle the complete cause of an event must include a 
goal (telos). Since the goal was not to meet each other, Aristotle calls this a chance 
event. Since these events have preceding necessary and sufficient deterministic causes 
for their occurrence, Ross would not identify them as “objectively underdetermined 
possibilities”. Whilst possibility and chance may be seen as related concepts for the 
modern philosopher, Aristotle’s totally different notion of causation means that he 
is not using the word “chance” in the same way and thus would not associate chance 
with possibility. We will see in section 2.7 that Aristotle’s notion of accidents or non-
necessary events may play a similar role to modern chance.
We next move on to consider two slightly more abstract notions of possibility: 
possibility viewed as a hypothesis put forward and possibility as a fictional world.
2.5 Possibility as a problematic element in a discussion
Hintikka (2004) argues that Aristotle’s scientific method is based upon question and 
answer dialogues variously called dialectics or elenchoi (depending on the nature of 
the premises involved). Some of the premises are necessary truths, some are merely 
true, while others, the problematic ones, are probable or possible. This means that they 
are contingent or that their truth-value is not known or even that they are ambigu-
ous expressions. This does not mean that we cannot handle them in a discussion. 
An ambiguous statement may be disambiguated and each of its different meanings 
may be evaluated. A necessary truth or counter-example might be used to eliminate 
one of the possibilities, thus making its opposite possibility true. As in the Socratic 
dialogues we may be left to confront our ignorance, but this is not always the end as 
we can then try a different approach. (Aristotle often rejects a line of argument and 
returns to reconsider a problem from a different perspective.) Finally we may derive 
conclusions from hypotheses, but be forced to recognise that they themselves are 
only possibilities. This will not give us knowledge of their truth, but may still provide 
a guide for action.
Hintikka’s work on Aristotle’s scientific method and this questioning game suggests 
that Aristotle did have this notion of possibility and Hintikka’s view seems justified by 
numerous passages from Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Prior and Posterior Analytics 
and parts of the Metaphysics.
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It is unclear to me what one should call this use of possibility, it resembles the 
hypothetico-deductive method in modern science, but the status of the hypotheses 
is unclear. Perhaps it is a sort of conceptual possibility. That said, this is definitely 
not an ontological use of possibility and thus Ross’s worry about a “sphere of real 
contingency” remains. Waterlow’s worry that possibility is identified with temporal 
notions seems diffused by this case since a conceptual possibility might remain in the 
realm of discussion and never be instantiated at a time in the real world. She might 
try to distinguish between hypotheticals which are like thought experiments, and pos-
sibilities which exist in an external real arena. Making this distinction is problematic 
as it seems to beg the question in favour of possibilities as occurring-at-some-time.
2.6 Possibility as an element of fiction
In Poetics, Aristotle discusses the construction of a good tragic play. Unlike Plato 
who thought the arts were dangerous since they could lead us away from the truth, 
Aristotle seems to have thought they could be used for moral instruction and also as 
a means of building a sense of community. In the Politics musical education is sup-
ported for this reason.
The characters in a tragedy must be believable. The events that occur should cor-
respond to real possibilities. The hubris of a nobleman is punished by the succeeding 
chain of events which lead almost inevitably to a tragic climax. A play is a possible 
world. This is a very modern component of our concept of possibility. If we can read 
the Poetics in this way, and it is my opinion that we can, then it would justify the view 
that Aristotle’s notion of possibility is not flawed, so much as complex.
2.7 Possibility as could-have-been-otherwise
In On Interpretation (chs 12, 13) Aristotle identifies the contradictory or opposite of 
possibility as necessity. [Aside for the logicians: this should mean that Necessary(P) 
does not imply Possibly(P). Given that Aristotle thinks of the necessary as the realm 
of the fixed and determinate, and possibility as the realm of the accidental or vari-
able then there should be no link between them, and so this axiom is defensible.] It 
is easier to find definitions in Aristotle of Necessity as compared to Possibility. Since 
they are contradictories this will allow us to construct a definition of possibility based 
around the opposites.
A common definition of necessity for Aristotle is “could not be otherwise”. Thus, 
since in at least one of his views, possibility is the opposite of necessity, we get that 
the possible is “that which could be otherwise”. I think the philosophically interesting 
notion of possibility which Ross is interested in is captured by this definition. In his 
discussion of accidents Aristotle explicitly asks whether an accident could be caused, 
(and hence could not be otherwise). He argues:
Evidently there are not causes and principles of the accidental, of the same kind as 
there are of the essential; for if there were, everything would be of necessity. If A is 
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when B is, and B is when C is and if C exists not by chance but of necessity, that also 
of which C was the cause, down to the last causatum as it is called (but this [A] was 
supposed to be accidental). Therefore all things will be of necessity, and chance and 
the possibility of a thing’s either occurring or not occurring are removed entirely from 
the range of events. (Metaphysics, XI ch. 8)
Here, Aristotle recognises the problem of determinism and how it eliminates pos-
sibility. This is further evidence that he identifies possibility with the idea that things 
could be otherwise: either A could occur or not-A.
Aristotle then goes on to reject this option, and claims the accidental is “inde-
terminate... and its causes are unordered and indefinite”. Aristotle does not give an 
argument for this position so we can criticise him for that. However, rather than 
reading Aristotle as making ontological claims, we might read him as simply defining 
his terms. This is a more detailed requirement for something to-be-otherwise: it must 
also be indeterminate and have causes that are unordered (so that there is no linear 
chain of causes transferring necessity to the event) and indefinite.
But this language is problematical here. “Indeterminate” might be read as mean-
ing “unpredictable”, which would identify this notion of possibility with a lack of 
knowledge. Furthermore, we might read the requirement that it be “indefinite” in 
the sense of not being fixed which, in contrast, looks like Ross’s notion of possibility 
as “objectively underdetermined”.
We can find some support for this reading in On Interpretation. There, Aristotle 
argues that the past is determinate and hence that past events could-not-be-otherwise. 
This does tie Aristotle’s thoughts about possibility to temporal notions. Our modern 
notion of possibility does allow us to say that a past event could have turned out dif-
ferently and we can then consider an alternative time line. This usage of the notion of 
possibility does not seem open to Aristotle. This issue may be restricted to the context 
of accidental events. As we have seen from the preceding discussions Aristotle may 
have had other notions of possibility which avoid this issue.
In the final part of this section I would like to focus on Book VI of The Nicomachean 
Ethics and argue that here Aristotle is giving us a case of “real possibility”.
2.8 Possibility as an expression of human free will or creativity
Consider Part 1 Book VI of The Nicomachean Ethics What is Aristotle doing in this 
book? It has been titled Intellectual Virtues but it does not seem to have a normative 
character. It is descriptive. I will suggest that Aristotle is doing cognitive science or 
moral psychology. He is telling us the structure of the mind and how it works.
Aristotle starts with Plato’s division of the mind into a rational part and an irrational 
part. (This might well correspond to the modern Freudian division of the mind into 
the conscious [rational] part and the irrational unconscious). Aristotle does not seem 
to be interested in the irrational part of the mind. The essential defining property of 
man is that he is a rational animal, so Aristotle focuses on the rational mind. It should 
be noted that we are not born with a fully formed rational mind, it is something that 
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we learn and develop as we become adults. Children are controlled by their desires 
and hence their behaviour is described by Aristotle as in-voluntary. A key component 
(sense) of voluntary and virtuous behaviour for Aristotle is rational thought.
So turning to the rational mind, what is it like? It consists of five parts or facul-
ties. A similar sort of picture of the mind can be found in modern psychology and 
intelligence testing where we identify seven different, specific faculties for mathemati-
cal ability, language abilities, spatial reasoning, logical reasoning and various verbal 
and specifically artistic skills (i.e. music) (Darley, 1988). This is clearly different in 
detail from Aristotle, but the general idea is similar.
The first faculty Aristotle identifies is that for scientific reasoning (ch. 3). This cor-
responds quite nicely with the modern faculties of deductive reasoning, mathematical 
reasoning and to some extent spatial reasoning. This faculty involves deductive logic 
or as Aristotle calls them “demonstrations”. It involves necessary truth, things that 
could not be otherwise. As Aristotle notes here and in On Rhetoric (bk 1, ch. 2) this 
is not a domain where philosophers discuss things since it is the realm of the neces-
sary and determinate.
The second faculty of the mind considered by Aristotle (ch. 4) is that part of the 
mind involved in techne. Techne is a specifically ancient Greek concept, but is most 
often translated as artistic or creative production. This is specifically identified as 
dealing with the realm of the variable. When we consider a creative act we consider 
that the product of the act can be anything. Anything is possible. Hence, I suggest we 
should read Aristotle’s term “variable” here, as a generator of real possibility.
The third faculty is prudence or practical reasoning, this is explicitly described as 
being in the realm of the variable. Aristotle believes all behaviour is goal directed (his 
telos theory). For plants and animals, and people acting according to the irrational half 
of their mind, the goal is survival and reproduction which is mediated by pleasure and 
pain. We, and animals avoid pain and seek out pleasure. Rational human beings are 
more than this, we set our own goals and behave so as to achieve them. This faculty of 
prudence or practical reason works out what our goals should be. Ideally they should 
correspond to virtuous behaviour.
The other two mental faculties Aristotle identifies are not as relevant to the discus-
sion of real possibility. Fourth is wisdom (Based on experience and inductive reasoning 
we get general premises and how to apply the general in particular cases), and fifth is 
intuition where intuition is a direct perception that something is true.
Now, it is my view that in human creativity and practical reasoning Aristotle has 
identified a domain of real possibility which satisfies Ross’s concerns. Human behav-
iour is something out there in the world and so has ontological status. Human agency 
is involved in creativity and goal setting, so as Ross says, it would appear to be real 
contingency for Aristotle.
According to Ross (1923:199) Aristotle’s model of this mental decision making 
involves Desire, Deliberation, Perception and Choice. Ross quotes Aristotle (Nico-
machean Ethics, 1112a18–1113a14, 1139a4) as describing “choice is ‘deliberate desire 
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of things in our own power,’ or, as Aristotle puts it elsewhere ‘it is either desireful 
reason or reasonable desire, and that sort of origin of action is a man’”. Ross goes on 
to suggest that this doctrine is an attempt to formulate a concept of the will. Human 
agency and the human will are a source of real possibilities.
However, there remains the epistemic problem: how do we know what someone 
else chooses? Our lack of knowledge about another person’s desires and the premises 
used in their reasoning means that we cannot know or predict what they will calculate 
they should do. Thus, we view their behaviour as encompassing various possibilities. 
This brings us back to Ross’s concerns that possibility might be identified with a lack 
of knowledge.
This epistemological worry also returns us to Waterlow’s position. Our lack of 
knowledge may only be resolved if we observe the goal driven behaviour or creative 
product at-some-time. We are only willing to call someone creative if they create some 
product, which must be situated in time. Thus this possibility is identified with the 
temporal notion of occurring-at-some-time.
3. Conclusions
I have argued that the concept of possibility is not a single, simple concept. I have 
suggested that Aristotle may have recognised possibility as capacity, possibility as not 
completely caused chance, possibility as a mental construct like a hypothetical or fiction, 
and possibility as arising from human agency or creativity. Translating fragmentary 
ancient Greek texts means that it is difficult to clearly find these different concepts 
explicitly described as possibility in Aristotle’s writings. Thus, the various objections 
to, and interpretations of, Aristotle’s modal theories do have some justification.
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